ABSTRACT Given the rapid increase in Internet streaming services to access multimedia content, to the detriment of traditional cable, satellite, and terrestrial, it is to be expected that this traffic will affect the performance of the Internet at several levels. One such level is the communication between autonomous systems that is primarily based on border gateway protocol (BGP). In order to understand this impact, a tool was developed to detect the problems that occur during a specific time period. This tool is able to identify and classify flapping events providing information about the networks potentially involved in the disruptions. The main focus of this paper is the analysis of the BGP updates registered during Super Bowl 2016 in order to understand how a large streaming event affects the Internet at the BGP level. Those results show that an increase in the number of updates happened during key times when a large number of concurrent viewers connected to the game. Many dampening and flapping events were observed accordingly. From those events, networks potentially affected were detected and categorized. The results of our study suggest that the Internet is not prepared to accommodate the potential streaming traffic generated during major events. This is of utmost importance for content providers and content delivery networks in designing their broadcast strategies which should take into consideration not only the scalability of their own servers but also the way in which data reaches the viewer. 
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is constantly evolving which makes the prediction of optimal protocols and approaches for the transmission of particular types of data extremely challenging. Take for example the growth of Video on Demand (VoD) and streaming services. According to the report in [1] , during 2015, real-time entertainment (streaming video and audio) traffic accounted for over 70% of North American downstream traffic in the peak evening hours on fixed access networks. This contrasts with 2010 when real-time entertainment accounted for less than 35%. Europe is quite similar in that real-time entertainment is also the largest traffic category accounting for 45.6% of peak downstream traffic. And, it is expected to grow due to the introduction of new Over-the-Top content (OTT) video services.
This change in Internet usage comes with problems both at the technical level and with the related peering policy agreements between companies allowing the transit of traffic between Autonomous Systems [2] - [5] . At the technical level, protocols like BGP were created many years ago when both the amount and type of traffic being transmitted were not as intensive as today. The protocol was last revised in 2006.
The subject of this paper is to understand how Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) behaves when the Internet experiences a large increase in traffic in a short period of time. In this paper, Super Bowl 2016 is the target of our analysis. During the Super Bowl, an average of 1.4 million people per minute streamed the game [6] . Of those, the peak visualizations occurred during Half Time [7] . Even though most people were able to see portions of the game, there were problems that made it impossible for a large number of viewers to watch critical moments of the game such as the kick-off [8] , [9] . Initially, the problem seemed to be related to a specific content provider. It was later shown that the problem was more widespread than a single provider [10] . Therefore, the disruptions must be caused somewhere between the CDN and the viewers.
Previous studies show a direct relationship between packet loss and BGP path failures. In [11] , it is demonstrated that although most packet loss is caused by phenomena other than routing dynamics, when routing failures occur, packet loss can last longer than other types of failures. The studies also show that most long-lived failures that are caused by routing dynamics can be attributed to BGP. There are many studies Comparison of packet loss due to routing path failures (in blue) and other reasons. For routing path failures, their duration is categorized. Source: [11] .
that show the significant impact that packet loss has on video quality [12] - [16] . Some examples are [13] and [14] in which the effects of packet loss on MPEG and MPEG-2 streams are analyzed. Other studies show the effects of packet loss on video-chat applications [15] or on High Definition Television (HDTV) [16] .
In the study presented in 2006 by Wang et al. [11] , the causes of packet loss are analyzed. The results of this study are summarized in Fig. 1 .
Based on Wangs study, 66.52% of packet losses were caused by routing related issues. Of those events, 47.5% lasted longer than 20 seconds, and, which is even more problematic, 40.5% lasted longer than 50 seconds.
The conclusions from these previous studies are that there is a direct relationship between: (i) BGP withdrawals and loss of data packets [11] and (ii) packet loss and a decrease in the Quality of Experience (QoE) for the viewer [13] , [14] . Therefore, if an increase in streaming traffic is directly related to an increase in BGP withdrawals, it would mean that the current approaches for streaming data over the Internet cannot be scaled indefinitely and that increased usage of streaming services could lead to significantly diminished QoE. In [6] , it is shown that between 2015 and 2016 there was a 75% increase in the number of streamers during the Super Bowl. Therefore, it is important to know if the increase in streaming traffic was related to an increase in BGP failures. If it can be demonstrated that many of the problems experienced by viewers coincided with problems related to BGP and the number of viewers continues to increase, in only a few years it will become impossible stream events such as the Super Bowl with current technology.
As a consequence, broadcasters and content delivery companies need to reconsider the manner in which data is sent to viewers considering not only server load but also the path that data traverses to reach its destination. New transport methods, including proactive Artificial Intelligence strategies which forecast Internet congestion, should be considered.
In this study, the relationship between intensive utilization of media streaming and increased BGP failures is demonstrated, especially the presence of flapping events. For that purpose, the BGP updates captured by a set of Vantage Points distributed in key locations and stored in the Rseaux Internet Protocol Europens (RIPE) dataset [17] were analyzed. Updates related to Autonomous Systems (ASs) registered in the United States were selected and used as input for the analytical pipeline described below.
As a first approach, the evolution of announcements and withdrawals has been studied and some interesting patterns were discovered. Events which could be related to dampening were also detected. This could be an indication that the network had insufficient capacity during the game.
With these promising results, shown at the end of the paper, there were sufficient clues to start processing updates in search of flapping events. For that, an existing method for the detection and classification of flapping events [18] was modified. The method, initially developed to analyze the behavior of a Tier-1 Autonomous System, was adapted for application to the available inter-AS data. In order to have more information about the causes of the disruptions, flapping events were classified and grouped into larger events containing many prefixes that could be related to the same event.
The last step of this study was to detect the ASs that caused the disruptions. For that, given the set of ASs involved in each of the classified events, path changes were analyzed for each AS_PATH field contained in a new update. Those ASs which did not have a path towards the destination were listed as potential failures. This method is based on the algorithms described in [19] but using the previously classified events as input.
The main contributions of this paper are the following:
• Demonstration of the relationship between big streaming events and BGP disruptions;
• Characterization of the changes occurring with such events over wide areas and large numbers of ASs, as is the case with the United States and
• Characterization of where and how these failures occurred. A secondary contribution was the development of an automated tool, based on the adaptation of some pre-existing methods, for detecting dampening/flapping events (using available inter-AS datasets) as well as the ASs potentially involved in large BGP disruption events. These tools might be used in the future for the continuous monitoring of the health of the network. This paper is structured as follows:
• In the next section, some background related to how the Internet works, and the BGP protocol (needed to understand the rest of the paper), are introduced.
• In section III, the methodology utilized for analyzing input data is described;
• In section IV, results of the presented study are shown and
• In section V, conclusions obtained from the presented analysis are drawn. In order to connect the ASs into a single network (the Internet), relationships are established between the owners of the ASs. These relationships are generally in two categories:
• Transit: The network operator pays money (or settlement) to another network for Internet access (or transit).
• Peer: Two networks exchange traffic between their users freely and for mutual benefit. The Internet is based on the principle of global reachability (sometimes called end-to-end reachability) which means that any Internet user can reach any other Internet user as though they were on the same network. Therefore, any Internet connected network must by definition either pay another network for transit or peer with other networks.
B. BGP UPDATES
Communication between ASs is performed by a set of routers that are in charge of directing data from/to routers located in the other ASs. These routers are known as Border Routers that interact with other Border Routers based upon Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). BGP defines, among other things, the paths needed to traverse from a source AS to another AS. BGP relies on a very simple set of heuristics to determine these data paths. The easiest of these to understand is shortest AS_PATH. Which means that the path which traverses the least number of ASs is selected regardless of available capacity on the Border Routers selected. As we will see later, the lack of available capacity on Border Routers, otherwise known as congestion, is directly related to poor Quality of Experience (QoE) from Internet streaming.
Each time a new router is introduced into the network or withdrawn, or there is a change in the configuration of an existing one, the Border Router sends a set of messages to the Border Routers connected to it indicating which ASs can now be reached through it. When a message is received, routers reconfigure their paths which produces a new set of messages generated from the updated routers. With this strategy, the Internet is able to self-configure each time a change occurs.
These messages are known as BGP updates, and they can be of two kinds: (i) announcements and (ii) withdrawals. Announcements are sent each time a new path is added to the configuration of the router. Withdrawals are sent when a path is no longer valid. Because of that, withdrawals are usually sent when a router is turned off for maintenance or there is a disruption. So a significant increase in the number of withdrawal messages could be related to large scale failures in the network.
C. ROUTE FLAPPING
Sometimes, a Border Router that must be traversed in order to follow a previously defined path gets congested and is not able to forward traffic to the next Border Router. This forces its neighboring Border Routers to remove paths passing through the congested Border Router (with the associated withdrawal messages). Generally, this is not be a significant problem since the other Border Routers look for an alternative route to reach the destination defined in the original path. There is a chance, however, that most of the Border Routers select, as a new path, one passing through the same new router. In that case, it could happen that the new route is not able to manage the sudden increase in traffic resulting in its congestion and withdrawal. During this process, the initial Border Router has had time to recover so Border Routers are reconfigured again to include the initial Border Router, repeating the reconfiguration -withdrawal process infinitely. This processs, represented in Fig. 3 , is known as route flapping, and it is very detrimental to video QoE since it can lead to long-lasting disruptions and loss of packets.
In order to avoid the propagation of route flapping, a strategy known as dampening is employed by many Border Routers in that prior to congestion a subset of its routing table is removed with the consequent withdrawal messages. By detecting the presence or absence of flapping or dampening, it is possible to ascertain if the network is providing an acceptable QoE.
III. METHODOLOGY
The applied methodology can be divided into two main steps: (i) flapping detection and classification and (ii) potential failure detection. As input, data available from RIPE [17] was used. From that dataset, both updates and Routing Information Base (RIB) data have been extracted and stored in a local database.
The analytical pipeline is shown in Fig. 4 . In that figure, it is possible to see that the set of BGP updates corresponding with the selected dataset are introduced in the first module, named Flapping detector. There, updates are grouped into flapping events which are then classified and clustered into groups of flapping events. The resulting clusters are the input of the next module, the Failure detector. There, BGP RIB and update information are used to construct a reachability matrix associated with the ASs involved in each of the clusters. At the end of the process, a set of ASs that potentially failed during the period are shown.
A. FLAPPING DETECTION AND CLASSIFICATION
The main purpose of this study is to analyze the relationship between potential disruptions in the connections between ASs at the BGP level and the increase in traffic due to large simultaneous connections during streaming events such as the Super Bowl. Some studies relate the number of BGP updates with problems in streaming communication [20] - [23] . Large increases in the number of updates are also related to flapping events. Based on this, a large number of updates could lead to poor QoE of streaming video over the network.
Accordingly, the first step in the analytical pipeline is to find the flapping events that occurred during a given period. For that, this first module is based on the work of [18] . In their paper, they try to characterize the reachability and visibility of a Tier-1 Internet Service Provider (ISP) AS by collecting the BGP updates from the periphery of the studied AS. For purposes of our study, their proposal is generalized by performing the same study for each AS in the United States network.
For that, it is important to understand how data is retrieved from the RIPE dataset [17] (since our work is based on a geographically, time-limited subset of it). There are many Vantage Points (VP) receiving BGP updates from peers. Each of those VPs sends the captured updates to one of 17 available Remote Router Collectors (RRC) from which data is available to be downloaded and processed. This process is represented in Fig. 5 .
Each BGP update carries fields that must be known in order to understand how our application works: first, the peer address and peer ASN which are the IP address and AS number of the VP peer from which the update was obtained; second, the prefix which is the destination IP subnet to which the update refers; third, the AS_PATH field which is the list of ASs that must be traversed in order to reach the prefix; fourth, the next hop which is the next hop a packet would take towards the prefix; and fifth, the type which can be an announcement (a new path is added) or a withdrawal (the path is removed from the list of available paths). These fields are part of the BGP protocol [24] . There are other fields, but these are not relevant for the purpose of our method.
Our processing engine is based on the work of [18] assuming that all ASs inside the US are being processed, not just a single AS.
1) GROUPING BGP UPDATES INTO EVENTS
In this step, the flapping events are detected as groups of BGP updates. These are ordered by the moment in which they were generated and grouped by prefix. For a given prefix, if the inter-arrival time between a pair of updates is below threshold τ max_interarrival_time in seconds, these are considered to belong to the same flapping event. Previous studies show that the path exploration process is often regulated by a 30-second MinRouteAdvertisementIntervalTimer (MRAI) [25] . This parameter determines the minimum amount of time that must elapse between two updates towards a particular destination by a BGP speaker to a peer [24] . It was set to 70 seconds [18] , which is 2 × MRAI + 10 (10 seconds VOLUME 5, 2017 were added for safety in order to account for some expected variance). The set of flapping events obtained will be later classified according to their influence on the overall behavior of the network.
However, some prefixes were continuously changing their paths since they never reached a stable state. In [18] , three main causes are detected for persistent flapping: (i) repeated failures of a weak edge link or external BGP (eBGP) session, (ii) oscillations produced by the Multi-Exit Discriminator (MED) attribute and (iii) the use of conservative flapdampening parameters. In those cases, if we had used the τ max_interarrival_time timeout, groups would have become huge (since convergence is never reached). In order to avoid such a problem, we discarded those events which exceeded a convergence timeout τ convergence = 10 minutes [18] . So groups lasting longer than this value were detected and rejected and were no longer used for the following steps of our study.
2) EVENTS CLASSIFICATION
Given a flapping event F, for each prefix p at a certain time t, a route vector RV t p is created, such as
where nhop i is the next hop for the involved update i produced at time t, and flag i indicates whether the route was learned by internal BGP (iBGP) or eBGP. By observing the evolution of RV t p along time, it is possible to classify the routing changes into the following categories: no change (the paths do not change), internal path change (an internal event causes a router to switch from one egress point to another), loss of egress point (a eBGP route disappears or it was replaced forcing a border router to select a iBGP route), gain of egress point (a new eBGP route appears, allowing a border router to change a iBGP route to a eBGP route) and external path change (a eBGP path was changed by a new one). Since we are only interested in the eBGP traffic, our study was reduced to the no change and external path change cases (that is, flag t i = flag t+1 i = eBGP and nhop t i = nhop t+1 i ). By classifying the route vector, it is possible to group the events to which those route vectors belong. We are interested in three different categories: Distant/transient disruption which are those events for which all elements of the route vector are classified as no change; Single external disruption which means that an event affects a single border router for an eBGP-learned route (just one r-vector element has a change of type external path change) and Multiple External Disruptions in which the event affects more than one router (that is, more than one route-vector element has a change of type external path change).
3) FLAPPING EVENTS CLUSTERING
Usually, when one flapping event occurs, disruptions are propagated along multiple prefixes/ASs. It is of interest to this study to know the influence of flapping events along all the involved prefixes. For this purpose, detected events have been grouped into larger clusters so those larger scale incidents can be detected.
Before clustering the events, frequently flapping prefixes are removed as described in [18] . The remaining events are grouped accordingly: (i) they must belong to the same category, and (ii) they start no more than seconds after the first event (with τ p = 660 seconds). Also, grouped events undergo the same transition. The resulting groups for the Super Bowl dataset are shown in section IV-B2.
B. POTENTIAL FAILURE DETECTION
At this point in the analysis, the set of flapping events that occurred during the Super Bowl were known and classified. Distant/transient events have no significant influence on the flow of traffic so single and multiple external disruption clusters were used as input for the next step.
In this step, for each of the clusters, the set of ASs involved were evaluated to detect which ASs were more likely to have caused the disruption. For that purpose, the PracticalRootCause algorithm introduced in [19] was used. Unlike other approaches, as for example, the NOOR approach [26] , the root cause of a path change observed at an AS is not assumed to be in the old path nor the new path after the change. The main advantage of the NOOR approach is that it is more robust with respect to missing and inconsistent measurements.
For this purpose, RIB information from RIPE was included as an input. For each AS in the study, the closest available set of RIB entries according to the starting date/time of the input cluster was obtained. Since it is very unlikely for the dampening time of the RIB entries to coincide with the starting time of the cluster, RIB entries were updated with the BGP updates obtained from the dump time prior to the starting time of the cluster. In the case of RIPE, RIB information was updated each eight hours, so in the case of the Super Bowl, data from 16:00 to 22:30 UTC (11:00 to 17:30 EST) must be reconstructed. At this stage, it was not possible to work at the prefix level since the only available information that could be used is the AS_PATH field. By using the information contained in that field, it was possible to create a matrix A RIB representing the existing paths between each pair of ASs by using the named RIB information. Each row A RIB contains the information relative to the ASs in which the Vantage Points were contained, and there was a column for each of the peering ASs for which an update was found. Each cell (i, j) contains the current paths existing between the ASs i and j. From A RIB , the matrix A 0 was obtained by adding the update information available between the last RIB dump and the start of the event. A 0 acts as the initial matrix for the remainder of the process.
The process described in this section cannot be performed for the entire country in a reasonable amount of time. This is why this process was done separately for each of the classified clusters obtained in section III-A. This justifies the need of the previous flapping detection/classification step by drastically reducing the number of ASs and updates to be processed. That means that a different A 0 was created for each cluster.
From each A 0 , a new matrix A t was created each time a new BGP update was retrieved from the cluster. When an announcement happened, one or more new paths were created between the ASs, and when a withdrawal was received, affected paths were removed. For each pair of matrices A t and A t+1 , the PracticalRootCause algorithm was called in order to test the current reachability of ASs v and s, where v was the AS which originated the update, and s was the AS of the destination prefix. The output of this algorithm was a set of ASs which were potentially the cause of the disruption. For each cluster, the set of candidate ASs was retrieved together with the number of times they appeared for that event. This information was used to populate the set of candidate ASs C, so if an AS already existed in the set C, its number of detections was updated as the sum of the previous value for that AS plus the new one. At the end of this stage, the set of detected ASs, and the total number of times they were detected along all clusters, was obtained.
In some cases, some of the ASs in the list were not actually causing any disruption, since as it was explained before, the dataset was incomplete, and the reason for which a certain AS was no longer reachable could have been because a path that actually existed was not represented in our dataset. In any case, it seemed that there was an increase in the number of potential disruptions in the time frames where the number of flapping events was larger. In section III-B, the results of applying this step to the Super Bowl dataset are shown.
IV. RESULTS
The main goal of this document is the analysis of the behavior of the Internet during large streaming events such as the Super Bowl. Having this in mind, the tool described in the previous section has been developed and applied over the set of updates retrieved from the RIPE dataset between 2016/02/07 17:30 and 23:30 EST restricted to those ASs registered in the United States. In the next sections, obtained results are presented and described. The main events that occurred during the Super Bowl are shown in Fig. 6 . All times in this document, unless the opposite is indicated, are represented in Eastern Standard Time (EST). 
A. BGP UPDATE ANALYSIS
The first analysis was focused on the type and number of updates received. This allowed us to assess whether there was any possible relationship between the Super Bowl event and an increase in the number of updates, especially the number of withdrawals. For that, we annualized the number of updates related to prefixes located in the United States. During the studied period, a total of 281,738 updates were registered. From those, 233,028 (82.71%) were announcements while 48,710 (17.28%) were withdrawals. In normal conditions, withdrawals should only appear in specific circumstances, like when a router is turned off for maintenance or when it fails. So this number of withdrawals is abnormally large. For example, if compared to another Sunday on February, namely the 21st, the total number of withdrawals was 9,862. This represents just 20% of the withdrawals found during the Super Bowl during the same period. 86,809 announcements were registered on the 21st for a total of 96,671 updates (just 34% of the total during the studied period). Finally, on average, for each 10 minutes 1,623.66 withdrawals were measured during the Super Bowl, while on Sunday, the 21st February that value was 328.73. The updates that occurred during Sunday, February 21st are represented in 7b along time.
In Fig. 7 , updates are represented along a time line. There, each bar represents the number of updates measured in 10 minute increments. Red bars represent the number of withdrawals; blue bars represent the number of announcements; and green bars represent the total number of updates (that is, announcements + withdrawals). Black vertical lines represent important times during the game, like the Kick Off or Half Time. As can be observed, there was a clear trend on the number of updates that began at the beginning of the event, just after the National Anthem, and lasted until time expired. This trend is in stark contrast with that observed during Sunday, 21st February. That day, there was not a recognizable pattern, and the number of withdrawals and announcements was, as seen previously, significantly smaller.
Other interesting findings can be observed from the relationship between the number of updates and the exact time they occurred. There were several salient spikes in the number of updates. The first peak occurred just prior to Kick Off, between 18:30 and 18:40. A new period with many updates began at the end of the first quarter which represents an important withdrawals peak. But the most important period of updates occurred during Half time. A large peak of withdrawals occurred at the beginning of Half Time. In fact, the period with the largest number of withdrawals occurred between 20:20 and 20:40, the time interval coinciding with Half Time. And, according to the media [7] , the time period with the largest number of viewers. The number of announcements was also large during that period. During the 4th Quarter, the number of updates was lower with the exception of the last peak just before the end of the game. As can be inferred from previous literature, there is a direct relationship between BGP disruptions, packet loss and a decrease of QoE. This could explain the problems experienced by viewers during the game.
With this information, it seems that there was a clear relationship between the Super Bowl and an increase in BGP activity on the Internet. In order to have a better understanding of what might have transpired during this period, we decided to look for related effects, like dampening or flapping. We started by looking at the former. In order to reduce the amount of data to be visualized, those prefixes with the greatest withdrawal activity were selected. For those prefixes, the ratio of the accumulated updates over time was computed using the following equation:
where a acc (t) = t i=0 a(t), and w acc (t) = t i=0 w(t). The representation of the different values of R(t) over time is shown at Fig. 8 for some selected prefixes. There, it is possible to see that for some of the prefixes being studied, there is a constant increase in the value of R(t) (which in some cases is especially rapid). This means that the prefix is receiving announcements, but at a higher rate than withdrawals. At a point, the number of withdrawals begins to grow faster causing a rapid decrease in the value of R(t). This behavior is quite close to that expected for a dampening event in which many of the announced paths are rejected at the same time.
If we focus on the first large spike, one will observe that most of the fast announced paths were rejected. Also, it is interesting that, as we observed for the previous chart, the greatest activity occurs during the pre-game show.
B. FLAPPING DETECTION AND CLASSIFICATION
At this point, it is quite clear that something happened at the BGP level during the Super Bowl. From section IV-A, we know that many prefixes needed to withdraw their IP addresses during the game. The existence of this phenomena suggests the potential presence of flapping events. Using the methods described in Section III, it is possible to detect such flapping events and classify them. In this section, the results related to the steps indicated in section III-A are described.
1) EVENTS CLASSIFICATION
Over 5,500 flapping events were identified from Super Bowl data. The result is shown in Table 1 .
The number of flapping events found for each category is shown together with the corresponding percentage of the total they represent. As seen, more than half of the total events were produced by distant ASs (from the point of view of the AS for which the flapping event was detected). 8.85% of the disruptions were caused by a single prefix, and the remaining 33.50% were multiple disruptions. This could mean that the detected failures could have affected a significant portion of the network.
In Fig. 9 , the detected flapping events are categorized by time and represented as bars ranging from transparent to opaque with the more solid color representing a greater occurrence of events at that given moment. With this in mind, it is possible to observe that there were more disruptions, both single and multiple, around 18:30, 20:20 and 22:30. There was also a slightly lower density of flapping events (but still significant) around 19:30 and 21:30. This is consistent with the data previously shown. Additionally, there were a large number of disruptions starting at 21:00. There is no clear explanation for this. Referring to Fig. 7 , at that time there was not a significant increase in the number of withdrawals or updates. As we will see in the next section, this disruption affected many prefixes. We think that the disruption could have been localized and not spread across the network, affecting just a subset of the prefixes. This possible explanation is partly confirmed in the next section.
There was also a noticeable increase of flapping events at the end of the game. This situation, which is clearer in the next section, began at Half Time. Since it was at that moment that the greatest number of viewers started watching the game, this could indicate that the network experienced instability that existed until the end of the game. 
2) FLAPPING EVENTS CLUSTERING
In Fig. 9 , only single or multiple external disruptions were utilized since according to [18] these should not directly affect traffic to the ASs for which the flapping events were computed. The output of this step is represented in Fig. 10 where the resulting clusters are shown over time. There, each bar represents a cluster of events. Their height indicates the number of prefixes involved, and the width is related to the time that each cluster lasted.
There were clusters during almost all the game with the largest clusters occurring at Half Time, the 3rd quarter, at the end of the game, and at Kick-off, in that order. These affected a considerable number of prefixes. The group of flapping events observed around 21:00 was related to a significant number of prefixes.
As introduced in the previous section, instability occurred during Half Time and continued for the remainder of the game. Following the large group associated with Half Time (group #29), there were a sequence of large events involving many prefixes. Some of these groups are analyzed in more detail in the next section, but data shown in this chart suggests a sequence of failures as a consequence of something that occurred during Half Time. Since this set of clusters is not grouped into a single cluster that continues over time, but a set of concatenated clusters, it seems that congestion could be the cause. Meaning that once a disruption event has finished, the same congestion situation occurs again starting a new episode of flapping events. 
C. POTENTIAL FAILURE DETECTION
At this point, we know that network flapping events occurred during the Super Bowl and that these events were more prevalent at points where traffic congestion occurred. However, the ASs involved in such events are still unknown. From the processing step described in section III-B, data shown in table 2 was obtained. In order to respect the names of the companies involved, alias were used. We distinguish between Tier1 ASs (those inside a Tier-1 network), ISPs (Those companies which are Internet Service Providers.), Hosting (Those companies offering hosting, cloud or other related services.), CDNs (Those companies that provide CDN services or streaming/multimedia.) and Others.
There, it is possible to observe the distribution of events during the entire Super Bowl. For each AS identifier, the total number of potential disruptions associated with it and the percentage of total disruptions it represents is presented. The ASs shown represent 90% of the total ASs involved. Observe that the highest number of disruptions are found for ISPs and Tier-1 networks. In both cases, this is expected. Tier-1 networks are hyper-connected to the rest of the ASs so a disruption which propagates amongst many ASs increases the probability of the Tier-1 networks being affected by the event. ISPs are where most of the streaming traffic and simultaneous connections occur since ISPs are the ASs where viewers of the game connect.
An indirect consequence is that packet loss occurs close to the users as most BGP problems occur directly on the ISPs. The consequence is that most of the packets need to be re-transmitted all the way from the CDN to the viewers. Since the same disruptions are occurring for other users connected to ISPs, the number of packets being re-sent could become even larger making the problem much worse.
In Table 3 , it is possible to observe the number of disruptions and the percentages that they represent. Here, it is clear that the largest number of potential disruptions were found for Tier-1 and ISP ASs. CDNs represent ASs offering Content Delivery Network services, but, as far as we know, none of them were directly related to the CDN which re-transmitted the game. Fig. 10 . In Table 4 , the number of disruptions grouped by AS type are shown. It calls attention to group #29 ISPs which had the second highest failure rate while group #31 ISPs had the lowest rate of disruptions. It re-enforces the theory that instability was initially created by the Super Bowl viewers and that this instability was then propagated throughout the remainder of the ASs in new, separate events. In other words, at the beginning of Half Time (group #29), the rapid increase in streaming traffic caused significant congestion on ISPs which needed to reconfigure their networks in order to support the load resulting in many flapping events. These changes and disruptions were then propagated throughout the Internet. This cascade of flapping events quite possibly reached the Tier-1 networks by the end of Half Time (group #31).
In order to understand the relationship between ASs and the CDN, the sub-network of the ASs involved in cluster #29 has been represented. This is shown in Fig. 11 . There, ASs are distributed by levels. The top level represents ASs containing the CDNs streaming the Super Bowl. The next level relates to the number of hops between the ASs represented and the CDN. For sake of clarity, just top-down connections are shown. Within parenthesis, disruptions computed for each AS are shown.
Of particular interest, at Level 1, one AS (CDN-3) experienced the majority of disruptions. It is especially interesting that most of the ASs with a largest number of potential disruptions were directly connected to CDN-3. At the same time, most of ASs (Hosting-6, ISP-8 and Hosting-3) are left neighbors of the AS which holds the largest number of potential disruptions (Hosting-2). The other two ASs with a larger number of disruptions are also directly connected.
Similar results were found for other flapping event clusters. Our explanation is that, in general, ASs which are closer to the CDN were not able to handle the traffic so they started rejecting paths. This forced their connected ASs to explore other paths and, in turn, they also failed. This propagated the problem throughout the network producing disruptions in traffic and an increase in latency.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents an exhaustive analysis on how BGP protocol is prone to fail during large streaming events. Based on previous works, BGP disruptions are related to an increase in packet loss and, as a consequence, a deterioration of the QoE. The Super Bowl is an excellent indicator since it is well know that problems occurred during the game.
From this study, it was observed that there was a noticeable increase in the number of withdrawals specifically during the time frames in which there were a larger number of concurrent connections. Dampening also existed with the greatest activity occurring minutes prior to kick-off.
In order to obtain the named data, a tool -detailed in this paper -has been implemented. This tool is able to detect flapping events occurring in the Internet during a specific time frame. Those flapping events are later grouped and classified. From the resulting groups, information about the networks involved in the disruptions was retrieved allowing us to know the list of ASs potentially involved.
Using updates retrieved from the RIPE database, flapping events were detected which were again concentrated in the same time frame. After classifying them, it was verified that most of those were multiple external disruptions. The events were grouped into clusters containing all of the involved prefixes. From these clusters, the ASs which had the highest probability to be involved in the event were extracted. Those potential candidates were categorized showing that most problems were caused by Tier-1 networks and ISPs. By studying the topology, it was determined that the problems started at the ISPs and were propagated towards the Tier-1 networks.
In this study, results suggest a correlation between an increase in streaming traffic and the number of BGP routing events caused by failures or highly congested devices. If this trend continues, it will be necessary to find new ways to stream data to viewers, without affecting the existing infrastructure or protocols, which could be very expensive and -in some cases -impossible.
As future work, we plan to find new ways to accommodate the growth in viewer streaming. One approach might be the application of Artificial Intelligence to forecast congestion and identify the optimal path to transmit data through the network.
DISCLAIMER
Super Bowl is a registered trademark of the National Football League (NFL), USA.
